THE ULTIMATE SIGN

Parashas Tazria

Uvayom ha-Shemini yimol b’sar orlaso ... on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised (Shemos 12:3). The Talmud [Shabbos 132a] derives from the seemingly redundant use of the word day [the verse could have said simply on the eighth] that the mitzvah of circumcision overrides the prohibition of inflicting a wound on Shabbos.

The Talmud elsewhere declares that a mumar l’chalel Shabbos - one who willfully desecrates the Shabbos - is considered to be a mumar l’kol ha-Torah kulo - one who would willfully desecrate the entire Torah. Observance of Shabbos has always been the standard against which a Jew was judged regarding his conformity to halachic requirements. The stringencies regarding Shabbos observance are well known; the Talmud only permits violating Shabbos law for a person suffering from a life-threatening illness or situation [pikuach nefesh] because it logically concludes that it is preferable to allow him [the person threatened] to desecrate one Shabbos so that he might fulfill many Shabbosos. Whereas the general leniency that prevails in a pikuach nefesh situation is based on a derivation from a pasuk [vechai bahem v’lo sheyamus bahem - he shall live by them (mitzvos) and not perish because of them] - the Talmud did not seem to find this to be sufficient cause to put aside the laws of Shabbos. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the mitzvah of milah - overrides Shabbos. Why not postpone circumcision until Sunday when the eighth day falls on Shabbos?

We might be tempted to suggest that the importance of milah is the fact that it is this act that most clearly identifies a person as being part of the Jewish nation. Indeed, circumcision is one of only two mitzvos aseh - positive mitzvos - punishable by kares! We find that an orel - a non-circumcised Jew - is not permitted to partake of the korban Pesach - the sacrifice most clearly connected to Jewish peoplehood. We might suggest that just as the Talmud rules that a non-Jew is subject to capital punishment for observing Shabbos, so too the orel must be circumcised - even on Shabbos - so as not to be culpable of non-sanctioned Shabbos observance.

In truth, however, this is not really a valid solution to our question, for the halachah teaches that if there is a medical reason [e.g., jaundice] to refrain from circumcising on the eighth day, milah does not override Shabbos. For example, if the eighth day fell on a Friday and medical considerations precluded circumcising the child on that day, we would wait until Sunday to perform the ceremony since milah she’lo bizmano eino docheh Shabbos - milah performed not at the specified time does not override Shabbos. Similarly, if there is a question as to whether the baby was born on Friday or Shabbos [e.g., if the birth took place bein hashmashos - between sunset and the beginning of night - on Friday], the circumcision would be delayed until Sunday. It could not be done on Friday, for it is possible that the baby is only seven days old. It cannot be performed on Shabbos, because if we consider the baby to have been born on Friday, he is nine days old on Shabbos and milah performed not at the specified time does not override Shabbos.

Both Shabbos and milah are referred to as os - a sign - signifying the special relationship between G-d and the Jewish people. We also find that tefillin are referred to as an os. Interestingly, the os of tefillin does not override Shabbos, i.e., we do not lay tefillin on Shabbos since we already have an os [of Shabbos]. Why not say the same thing as regards milah; i.e., since Shabbos is already an os there is no reason why the os of circumcision should override it.

I would like to suggest that the os of milah is composed of two distinct components. On the one hand, milah represents a physical sign that we make in our bodies to demonstrate that we consider ourselves to be part of the covenant of Avraham, with all of the attendant restrictions and benefits. That part of the os of milah would not override Shabbos, just as the os of tefillin is set aside for Shabbos. Our observance of Shabbos itself is the ultimate evidence of our acceptance of our unique relationship with G-d and, indeed, a non-Jew who observes Shabbos is liable to the death penalty because he is assuming a covenantal relationship that does not exist.

At the same time, milah has a second os component. The Talmud [Shabbos 135a] explains that milah is done on the eighth day as an indication of the woman’s returning to a state of ritual purity after childbirth. The Torah rules that when a woman gives birth to a boy, she is tamei for seven days and milah is done on the eighth. But if a woman gave birth through Caesarian section, the child’s milah would not be performed on Shabbos, since she never became tamei. Similarly, if the milah is done after the eighth, it does not override Shabbos, since it does come to demonstrate her release from her state of ritual impurity.

While the os of Shabbos observance is greater than the os of tefillin or of the act of circumcision and is therefore not discarded, the separate os of milah that comes to signify the ascension from tumah to taharah does not find expression in Shabbos and it is for this reason that only milah on the eighth day, when we actually celebrate the mother’s ascension, overrides Shabbos.

THE SOUND OF SILENCE

Parashas Shemini

Vayomer Moshe el Aharon, hu asher dibair Hashem ... vayidom Aharon ... and Moshe said to Aharon, this is what Hashem had said ... and Aharon was silent (Vayikra 10:3)

The day must have been glorious and full of promise. At least part of the sin of the golden calf was about to be expiated, the Tabernacle had been constructed and the means put into position for man to achieve atonement for his sins. Man had demonstrated that his efforts could bring the Shechinah to the temporal world [see our comments to Pikudei]. It was a moment of incredible fulfillment, an instant in time when Heaven and earth were in perfect harmony.

And precisely then, tragedy strikes. Nadav and Avihu are killed by a fire emanating from Heaven and entering their nostrils. Something that they have done, some sin of omission or commission has brought death to Aharon’s oldest sons, his fellow kohanim/servants of Hashem. The Torah is cryptic in describing their sin ... vayakrivu lifnei hashem eish zarah asher lo tziva osom ... they brought a strange fire before G-d that He had not commanded them (ibid. :1). Chazal offer a variety of explanations as to the character of this aish zara - foreign fire. Some maintain that the brothers entered the kodesh hakedoshim - the innner sanctum - with their own incense. Others maintain that their sin was somewhat less grievous, a question of timing. They did not actually go into the inner sanctum but brought incense on the altar in the kodesh even though they had not been instructed to do so. They knew that there was a commandment to do so daily and set out to fulfill it. However, they failed to wait for Moshe to command them to do so, not realizing that he was waiting for the Heavenly fire to appear on the altar before proceeding with the rest of the service.

Another opinion maintains they were guilty of reaching a halachic decision without consulting Moshe. In their opinion, it was permissible to use a fire whose source was not from the altar. Irrespective of whether or not this was correct; they should have consulted with Moshe before acting. Another school of thought teaches that the sons entered the Tabernacle while inebriated, or that they set out to perform the Divine service even though they were celibate. These latter opinions would seem to be of the opinion that aish zara - the foreign fire - should not be interpreted literally, but rather as a euphemism for misguided zeal - i.e., in the case of wine they were culpabale for using an external means to demonstrate their spirituality or in the case of serving while unmarried they were guilty of equating permanent abstinence with holiness.

The common denominator for all these opinions is that Nadav and Avihu were worthy of death because they went beyond the parameters of what G-d had commanded at a point in history when no deviation could be sanctioned. As pure as their intentions might have been, they violated the first rule of the Divine service: It must be performed precisely in the manner that G-d commands. Man is tempted, as we have mentioned in the past, to add his own flavors and spices to the menu of avodas Hashem, motivated by a sincere desire to make it more meaningful and relevant. But while his conscious intent might be laudable, subconsciously he is declaring that only he - man - can determine the proper way of creating the bond between G-d and man.

G-d is therefore exacting in his requirements, especially when it comes to the tzaddikim with whom he is m’dakdek k’chut ha-s’arah - stringent even as concerns a hair’s breadth [of deviation from His commands]. The tzaddik must act as a role model and if he permits himself even minor changes, it follows that the common man will make major changes. This was the essence of Moshe’s response to Aharon’s anguished attempt to understand what had transpired.


B’krovei ekodesh v’al pnai kol ha-am e’kovaid ... I will be sanctified by those who are near to Me and through this, the entire nation will respect Me (ibid. :4). Moshe reassures Aharon that Nadav and Avihu must have been holier than either of them, for they had been chosen as the vehicles through which this Divine lesson would be taught. Their death, for a sin that would seem to be minor, would serve as an everlasting warning to be extraordinarily careful.

And Aharon’s reaction: silence! Rashi explains that Aharon was rewarded for his silence, but the silence nevertheless seems to be astounding. It does not state that Aharon accepted Moshe’s explanation of the events, it does not tell us that Aharon was consoled by his brother’s words. All it says is that he was silent. Whatever doubts he might have had, whatever pain he might have felt, whatever questions he still wanted to ask were put away in the drawer, never to be removed.

It is now almost a month since eight young tzaddikim were murdered in the library of Yeshivas Merkaz HaRav in Yerushalayim. Through our sins, we lack Chazal to explain what G-d’s plan was in taking them, how their deaths serve to teach us what we need to change, what we need to improve. All that we have is the silence of Aharon, the stoic strength to accept the Divine decrees that we cannot understand.

EXPANDED AND IMPROVED

Parashas Tzav

Va’ya’as Aharon u’vnav es kol hadevarim asher tzivah Hashem b’yad Moshe ... and Aharon and his sons did all of the things that Hashem commanded through Moshe (Vayikra 9:36)

The laws regarding each of the thirteen different types of korbanos were exceedingly complex; where they were to be offered, how they were to be sacrificed, what else was brought with them [incense, libations et. al.]. Nevertheless, Aharon and his sons were able to fulfill the requirements with precision and as Rashi comments, this is their praise; they did not deviate at all from any of the instructions that Moshe gave. The Maharal [Gur Aryeh to Rashi], noting that the commandments were given by Moshe rather than directly by G-d, points out that lesser people might have resented Moshe’s insistence on precision. Aharon and his sons, however, accepted that Moshe was the messenger of G-d and they consequently were no less reluctant to heed his commands than they would have been willing to fulfill the commands had they been issued directly by G-d. In this sense, their actions are a lesson that we should all learn; not to resent authority, but to accept it [when it is validly applied and does indeed represent the will of G-d].

Throughout sefer Vayikra, we finds this idea being expressed; Aharon’s ability not to deviate or change the instructions of Moshe. Aharon’s ability to subjugate his own feelings and understanding of a situation is a remarkable lesson in self-discipline and in true anavah - humility. As we have noted elsewhere, Netziv comments that it is part of human nature to try to make our own imprint, to even take G-d’s commands and try to improve upon them. This is the root of the sin of the nazir, who for very valid reasons [his fear that he lacks self-control] takes upon himself obligations [refraining from drinking wine and coming into contact with a corpse] that the Torah does not demand. He is termed a choteh - a sinner - for his actions and must offer a sacrifice.

There is an old story taught about a writer who decided to translate Shakespeare into Yiddish. Asked for the title of his work, he replied: “Shakespeare fargressert und farbessert” [Shakespeare, expanded and improved]. If it is natural for us to try to improve upon the classics of literature, is it not natural for us to try to improve upon the ways of G-d? Are we not all experts in the will of G-d - perhaps even greater experts than G-d himself?

We find a similar attitude regarding some of the events surrounding Purim. Mordechai, the leader of Shushan Jewry, exhorts his fellow Jews to distance themselves from the celebrations arranged by Achashverosh, but his remonstrations fall on deaf ears. His fellow Jews feel that they are more astute observers of Persian politics and ignore the pleas of Mordechai. He is afterall, only a member of the Sanhedrin. What does he know or understand about real politics? It is only da’as Torah, they argue, nothing they need take seriously.

POWER CORRUPTS

Parashas Vayikra

Daber el b'nei Yisrael laimor, nefesh ki sechetah b'shgagah ... speak to the children of Israel saying, if a person sins inadvertently (Vayikra 4:2)

Most of the commentaries focus on the purpose of korbanos, choosing sides, as it were, in the well known disagreement between Rambam [as brought in the second section of Moreh Nevuchim] and Ramban. The latter takes the Rambam to task in unusually hard criticism, referring to Rambam's contention that the korbanot were a reaction to the nation's desire to continue their idol worship as divrei ha'vai - meaningless words. According to Ramban, the purpose of the animal sacrifice is to provide man with the chance to reflect upon his sins and become even more closely bound to Hashem. Through this kirvas Elokim he is ultimately protected from further sin, by realizing that it is he who should be paying with his life. The substitution of the animal in his place and the public nature of the sacrificial process provide man with the impetus and wherewithall to be more careful in the future.

Much of this week's parashah focuses on the korban chat'os - the sin offering. The Torah delineates various types and each has its own set of rules as well as common rules that govern each one. There is the offering brought by a kohen who has inadvertently transgressed the Torah through an incorrect ruling regarding any part of the Divine service (see 4:1-12). Because of his high station, and his position as a halachic decisor, the kohen is obligated to bring a special korban which differs from that which he would have to bring were his sin only related to his personal conduct.

This chat'as differs from the sin offering brought on behalf of the entire nation which had sinned because of an erroneous decision by the Sanhedrin (ibid. 4:13-21) and they both differ from the sin offering brought by the king - the political leader of the people (see 4:22-26). Here, the reference is to a king who commits a sin unrelated to his office; i.e., he sinned in the same manner as any other individual. Unlike the kohen whose individual korban is only brought when his sin concerns his public office, the king has a separate chat'as for both private and public sins. Rav Hirsch points out, because of his position of supreme authority, his sacrifice differs and he brings a male goat rather than a female sheep. Finally, there is the cha'tas brought by an individual who transgresses inadvertently (ibid. :27-35).

Sforno notes that in the pesukim preceding the korbanos of the kohen, the Sanhedrin and the individual, the Torah uses a conditional introductory phrase; e.g., nefesh ki sechetah - if a person sins (ibid. :2) or v'im kol adas Yisrael yishgu - if all of Israel shall act mistakenly (ibid. 13) or v'im nefesh achas techetah - if an individual should sin (ibid. :27). On the other hand, in introducing the parashah of the nasi who sins, the Torah states (ibid. :22), asher nasi yechetah - when the ruler sins - which seems to suggest a sense of inevitability. He notes that such is the character of office; the power that the ruler is given will lead him to sin for it corrupts him and makes him believe that what is forbidden to other is permitted to him. And if power corrupts, then absolute power corrupts absolutely.

He is therefore given a personal korban for his atonement, for it is insufficient for him to simply be contrite on the personal level. Rather, he brings a completely separate korban to remind him not to allow power to go this head. How prescient that this week's parashah should deal with such a topical issue, a ruler [or governor of a great State] guilty of the very kind of moral turpitude that he so strongly condemned in others. One wonders what kind of kapparah is necessary.

RECIPE FOR SWEETNESS
Parashas Pekudei

Vayar Moshe es kol ha-melachah, v’hinei asu osah ka’asher tziva Hashem ken asu, vayivoraich osom Moshe ... and Moshe saw all of the work and behold they had done it in the manner that G-d had commanded, and Moshe blessed them (Shemos 39:43)

Rashi, quoting the Midrash, explains that Moshe’s first prayed that it should be G-d’s will that His Shechinah rest upon them. He then added the verse, later incorporated into Tehillim (90:17): v’yehi noam Hashem Elokeinu aleinu, u’ma’aseh yodeinu konenah aleinu, um’aaseh yadseinu koneneihu ... and may the pleasantness of Hashem our Lord be upon us, and just as the work of our hands has brought it upon us, [so too] may the work of our hands [in the future continue] to bring it upon us. Rav Dovid Mann, shlita, rosh yeshiva of Kfar Chassidim, once explained the concept of noam Hashem - the pleasantness of Hashem - to which Moshe refers.

Malbim points out, in his introduction to sefer Vayikra, that there are no synonyms in lashon hakodesh. The precision of the Hebrew language is such that each word conveys a different idea. Noam - which we have translated as pleasantness but which has a connotation of sweetness and tranquility as well - is not a synonym for good. Something can be good without being sweet; e,g., a medication might well be good for me even though it is foul tasting and has side effects. Similarly, a surgical procedure might be beneficial and necessary - i.e., good - yet I would never characterize it as being pleasant. In English, on the other hand, we can describe something as being pleasant even though it is not good for us. Lashon hakodesh however, does not provide for this possibility. If something, relating to G-d, is described as being noam - pleasant - then it is both sweet and good. Noam Hashem is thus an elusive and rare quality. Intellectually, I can accept that kol d’avid l’tav avid - all that He does is for the good. Nonetheless, it is often difficult to discern how G-d’s actions, albeit good, can also be deemed pleasant. Given this problem, one can understand why Dovid ha-Melech prayed (Tehillim 27) that he be given the opportunity lachazos b’noam Hashem - to glimpse the pleasantness of G-d - even though he expected (ibid.) l’iros b’tuv Hashem - to see the goodness of G-d.

In a number of places, Rashi comments that the phrase ken asu in the passuk above teaches us that the work was performed exactly as commanded by G-d; i.e., every Divine instruction was precisely fulfilled and nothing was added or subtracted by either Aharon or Betzalel or whoever else was fulfilling Moshe’s instructions. Last week, we noted that man often has a tendency to try to do more than he is commanded in an attempt to achieve a spiritual bond with G-d. Later, we will see that many of the commentators see this as the root of the sin of Nadav and Avihu, Aharon’s sons who died during the consecration of the Mishkan because they had brought a fire which G-d had not commanded.

Reading the pasuk from this week’s parashah, one would assume that the reason why Moshe blessed the people that they be able to see noam Hashem was v’hinei asu osah ka’asher tziva Hashem ken asu, - because they built the Mishkan precisely according to the directions received and made no changes or additions of their own. How is fealty to Hashem linked to experiencing noam Hashem - the pleasantness of G-d? Again, intellectually I can accept that all that G-d does is not only ultimately good, but is good in itself. This does not, however, make the Divine way pleasant or sweet. As a case in point, take the fast of Yom Kippur. Clearly it is good for me, for it brings me forgiveness. It might even be physically positive. Nevertheless, the Torah refers to fasting, as well as to the other prohibitions of Yom Kippur as being inuyim - afflictions - which I accept upon myself and does not see them as being representative of noam Hashem.

Perhaps the key to understanding this is to go back to Moshe’s blessing. He first told the nation that it was his prayer that G-d rest the Shechinah upon Israel; i.e., that the Divine presence be palpable and tangible. He then added that this resting of the Shechinah should be the result of their actions; i.e., something that they could bring forth and that was not necessarily beyond their grasp. What greater blessing could there be than to realize that man has the ability, as it were, to bring G-d’s presence to this world, how empowering a thought. All of man’s suffering, all of his pain, all of his turmoil, is it not but a manifestation of the confusion caused by the Divine being hidden? When man sees G-d’s Hand as clearly as he sees his own, then he will also experience the pleasantness of His ways. And this all is dependent upon one thing, following G-d’s law precisely instead of confusing it with our own misinterpretations.

Moshe saw this when they completed the Mishkan. The Shechinah took up residence and the world existed in perfect harmony and balance. We have it within our powers - ma’aseh yadeynu - to recreate that moment.

FORBIDDEN RECIPES - PART II

Parashas Vayakhel

V’es habosem v’es hashamen, la’maor ul’shemen hamishchah v’liktores hasamim ... the spice and the oil, for illumination and for the oil of anointing and for the ketores (Shemos 34:28)

Last week we noted that the Torah forbade duplicating the mixtures used for the anointing oil and for the ketores. The Torah also proscribed using the anointing oil made by Moshe whereas there was no parallel proscription regarding the ketores made by Moshe. We also noted that these proscriptions were punishable by kares whereas illicit use of any other utensils connected to the Divine service was not a capital crime. While duplication of the menorah crafted by Betzalel and Moshe might be forbidden, one who did so was not subject to kares. Similarly, if one used the mizbeach for a barbeque, as distasteful as this might be, his punishment would be lashes and a fine for misuse of something sanctified. The question that we posed was why are the anointing oil and ketores different?

As a preface, I suggest that we first try to analyze the sins themselves; most specifically, what would entice man to commit these types of aveirot. Why would anyone want to duplicate the oil and ketores or use the oil prepared by Moshe? Netziv, in his commentary to Shir ha-Shirim, poses a similar question. It is understandable, he writes, why man would be tempted to violate the sin of ba’al tigra - of fulfilling a mitzvah in an incomplete fashion. For example, the Torah requires that one refrain from eating chametz for seven days. Man, either because of his distaste for matzah or his uncontrollable urge for chametz might decide that this mitzvah is just too difficult. Reluctant, however, to completely ignore the Torah, he decides to make his life easier by declaring that the mitzvah is not really for seven days but perhaps only for six or five. He has thus satisfied both his conscience as well as his yetzer ha-ra. How often do I, as a teacher, hear students declare emphatically that a law that they violate is not really an aveirah but simply a chumrah. They do so because they are reluctant to admit that they are doing something wrong and prefer the comfort of self-delusion.

On the other hand, Netziv comments, we have a similar proscription of ba’al tosif - overfulfilling the mitzvot; for example, a man who makes tefillin with five parshios in the batim. Why, Netziv asks, would any rational person want to do this? The Torah was obviously not addressing crazies! What urges would cause a person to do this?

In his answer, Netziv points to a psychological truth that I have found to be compelling. Usually, man sins because he cannot control his urges or because he seeks to limit G-d’s ability to legislate his life. Fearful of G-d, and essentially a believer, he creates a G-d who fits his own image, interpreting or reinterpreting what G-d says to fit his needs. However, there also people who become overly enraptured by their own spirituality or their search for a connection to the Divine. They seek to become holier than commanded, reluctant to allow things that the Torah clearly permitted. The prime example is the nazir, referred to as a kodesh but who must nevertheless offer a korban chatas for having chosen to deny himself that which the Torah saw as permissible. According to the Netziv, this was the basis of Shlomo’s failures, for he thought that he was immune to the inevitable results of this kind of search for spirituality. Shlomo took more wives than permitted, claiming that ani osif v’lo echta - I can take more but I will not be drawn to sin - but he was wrong, for ultimately they turned his heart away from Hashem. When man creates his own parameters of kedushah, he rejects the boundaries set by G-d. Although his intentions might be good, he is in fact recreating G-d in the image of man. In this, he is an oved avodah zarah, for he worships himself.

Why would anyone want to use the shemen hamishchah prepared by Moshe or duplicate the formulas of the oil and the ketores? Might we not suggest that the urge to do so is a result of a person’s mistaken need to assume a level of spirituality above that which he deserves. Think of the person who says to himself: “If I could take the oil prepared by Moshe and anoint myself, would that not automatically make me as holy and spiritual as the vessels and people anointed by Moshe? If I could but duplicate the smells of the ketores would that not make me the conduit through which atonement for Israel’s sins would flow?” This man might have begun his quest out of a true desire for spirituality, but he ended up being self-serving. His kares is a result of his having been reluctant to accept the limitations that G-d has placed upon him - a sin typical of the avodah zarah family.

FORBIDDEN RECIPES - PART I
Parashas Ki Sisa

Shemen mishchas kodesh ... al b’sar adam lo yisach u’v’maskunto lo sa’asu kamohu, kodesh hu ... the oil for sanctified anointing ... no person should use it for anointing and its recipe you shall not duplicate, it is sanctified (Shemos 30:31-32)

Rashi, quoting the Talmud [Kerisus 5a], notes that there are two distinct prohibitions in this verse. The first [al basar adom lo yisach] specifically proscribes using the oil that Moshe Rabbenu produced for anything other than its original intention. If I produced the exact same mixture of anointing oil on my own, I would not violate this prohibition by using it for myself or giving it to someone else. However, I would be in violation of the second proscription [u’v’maskunto lo sa’asu kamohu] which forbids following the recipe used by Moshe to create an anointing oil with the very same ingredients in the same proportion. Should I or someone else use that oil, however, there would be no additional violation. In other words, as regards the oil produced by Moshe there is a prohibition of using it whereas as regards oil that I make on my own, the prohibition only pertains to production. The punishment for either prohibition is kares.

The next parashah deals with the production of the k’tores used on the interior mizbeach. The Torah (ibid. :38) states: ish asher ya’aseh chamoha l’hariach bah, v’nichras mei’amav - a person who makes something similar to smell, and he shall be cut off from his people. Rambam (Klei ha-Mikdash 2:9) notes that the prohibition is dependent upon the producer’s intent; i.e., if they intended to use it as incense, they are in violation even if they did not actually use it. Moreover, if one used ktores but did not actually produce it, he would not be punished with kares; rather he would be subject to the same fine as anyone who derived benefit from anything that was consecrated. In this sense it would seem that the k’tores is similar to the second shemen hamishchah prohibition in that the laws concerns production rather than use.

However, this is not entirely accurate, for as regards the ktores, one is in violation even if one does not use the same amounts provided that one uses the same proportions. As regards shemen hamishchah, one is only in violation if both the proportions of ingredients and weight are precisely the same as in Moshe’s recipe.

A number of questions present themselves. In only a few other cases concerning the Divine service in the Mishkan/Mikdash do we find similar halachos calling for punishment for having duplicated something. One is specifically forbidden to create a human form of gold or silver like the keruvim [see 20:20 and Rambam, Avodah Zara 3:10-11] or exact replicas [e.g., a seven branch menorah] of the vessels used in the Mishkan/Mikdash] or playing the chatzotzrah made by Moshe. If one does so, however, he is not liable for kareis as he is here. Hence, we need to determine why non-sanctioned production/use of shemen hamishchah and k’tores is dealt with so stringently [kareis!]. Moreover, why does the Torah differentiate between the two, each having a stringent side [using the shemen hamishchah made by Moshe and making k’tores with non-identical weight] and a lenient side [the k’tores if not used to smell and anointing oneself or another person with private label shemen hamishchah].

As was the case with the clothing of the kohanim discussed in last weeks parashah and the utensils used in the Mishkan/Mikdash discussed in parashas Terumah, it is obvious that the incense and anointing oil have great symbolic value. Although we do not know understand why they used those particular ingredients in that particular mixture and with these weights, we can understand the symbolism of both products. The essence of the Divine service in Judaism is to elevate that which appears to be natural and extend to it spiritual meaning. This is the basis of the concept of korbanot, for example. Netziv explains that the sacrifices are referred to as lechem - bread - related to lechem - to bond. Bread is both the very basis of natural life [along with water of which Torah is symbolic] and of spiritual life [the offering to G-d who has no natural needs] and as such provide the bond between man and G-d.

Shemen and k’tores are also part of this process and b’ezras Hashem we will try to examine their meaning and answer the questions we posed.